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Abstract
Theoretical models are an important tool for many aspects of sci-
entific activity. They are used, i.a., to structure data, to apply theories
or even to construct new theories. But what exactly is a model? It
turns out that there is no proper definition of the term “model” that
covers all these aspects. Thus, I restrict myself here to evaluate the
function of models in the research process while using “model” in the
loose way physicists do. To this end, I distinguish four kinds of models.
These are (1) models as special theories, (2) models as a substitute
for a theory, (3) toy models and (4) developmental models. I argue
that models of the types (3) and (4) are considerably useful in the pro-
cess of theory construction. This will be demonstrated in an extended
case-study from High-Energy Physics.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to motivate and explicate the following three
theses:
Thesis 1: Physics is not some ready-made thing but a dynamic process.
Thesis 2: This dynamic process is exhibited in the continuous endeavor of
theory construction.
Thesis 3: As a major tool for theory construction, scientists use models.
Prima facie Thesis 1 sounds trivial and does not seem to need any expli-
cation. Moreover, philosophers of science such as T.S. Kuhn, I. Lakatos, L.
Laudan and many others have often reminded us of this phenomenon. How-
ever, it appears that there are some consequences of this thesis that do not
belong to the “common knowledge” of current philosophy of science.
Physics, like all of science, is a human activity. One important feature of this
activity is the physicist’s pragmatic attitude: Various approximation schemes
are applied that are often not justified, possibly inconsistent approaches are
used (such as renormalization) and many other procedures that – somehow
– lead to what constitutes the success of physics, e.g., highly corroborated
predictive theories are also employed.
Most of theoretical physics1 is – in this sense – preliminary [3]. In order
to fully understand physics from a philosophy of science point of view these
features have to be taken into account. If philosophers of science do not
want to leave a big field to sociologists of science, they have to study more
carefully what physicists are doing at their desks and – as I. Hacking [11]
might add – in their labs.
The special focus of this article is on theory construction. Many of today’s
“theories” are finished in a strict sense. Theories seldom satisfy all the strong
criteria that philosophers of science sometimes demand [6], they describe
some parts of the world satisfactorily and fail to cover others. Thus, theory
construction is a good example for the process-like character of physics. This
is Thesis 2.
For a long time, philosophers of science did not look very deeply into the ac-
tual process of theory construction. K. Popper and the Logical Empiricists
1The same probably holds true for experimental practice, cf. [10, 11]. This article,
however, is only concerned with theoretical physics.
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claimed that the philosopher can only be concerned with what Reichenbach
called the context of justification. The context of discovery, on the other
hand, belongs exclusively to the realm of psychology. In recent years, a lot of
work has been done to better understand what scientists do when they are in-
ventive. Psychologists aided by computer scientists have developed programs
(such as BACON and others) that simulate human thought processes dur-
ing the discovery of scientific laws.2 Philosophers, too, recently re-discovered
the “logic of discovery” as a subject matter worth consideration.3 However,
there is still much work to be done on better understanding what scientists
do when they are inventive.
L. Nowak, in his book The Structure of Idealization [19], suggested that
the techniques of idealization and concretization well known in the empirical
sciences also apply, for instance, in the philosophy of science.4 In physics,
one often begins with a collection of (relatively) unstructured data. Then,
step by step, physicists attempt to integrate them into some more general
framework. In the same way, this paper focuses primarily on a description
of what scientists actually do. As a special but important example, the role
that models play in the process of theory construction is investigated. In
the remainder of the paper it will be shown that models are indeed a major
tool in this process. This, in turn, validates Thesis 3. In some future work,
my reconstruction can be improved by formalizing the procedure, maybe in
terms of the structuralist framework.5 In this respect, the present work is
also only preliminary . . .
By choosing examples from contemporary physics, especially from quantum
field theory, I intend to contribute to a rather neglected sub-field of philoso-
phy of science. I cannot expect that this work will be of much direct use to
a practicing physicist. However, I hope that keeping philosophy as close to
science as possible will finally result in some knowledge that proves skeptical
physicists such as S. Weinberg wrong. The Noble Laureate of 1979 remarked:
“The knowledge of philosophy . . . helps us (only) to avoid the errors of other
philosophers.”6
2An informative exposition can be found in [14].
3A survey of the relevant work till 1980 can be found in the two volumes [17, 18], edited
by T. Nickles.
4I wish to thank T.A.F. Kuipers for drawing my attention to this.
5Some work in this direction can be found in [5].
6[27], p. 133.
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The paper is organized as follows: In Sec. 2 I contrast two different views of
models, the Classical View (Sec. 2.1) and the Diachronic View (Sec. 2.2).
The Classical View stresses static aspects of science whereas the Diachronic
View covers vital dynamic aspects of theory change. In Sec. 3 a case-study
from High-Energy Physics illustrates what has been called a Developmental
Model. Finally, Sec. 4 sums up the main results.
2 Two Different Views of Models
The aim of the present paper is not to exactly define what a model in physics
is. The reason for this abstention is, however, not that I share T.W. Adorno’s
view that definitions are rational taboos.7 As early as 1961, L. Apostel
noticed that a definition proper of the term “model” was, in fact, impossible,
since “model” is used with so many different meanings in science, logic and
philosophy [4]. That situation has got even worse in the last thirty years.
In the language physicists use, it is already hard to distinguish between the
meaning of “model” and “theory”. So, for example, the “Standard Model”
of the strong-electroweak interactions is certainly considered a fundamental
theory.
How can we understand this almost inflationary use of the term “model” in
science? One reason is that “model” reflects the fact that the construction
presented by a physicist is not supposed to be the “final” answer to the
problem in question: The standards a theory has to fulfill do not necessarily
apply to models. In a way it is safer – if one is skeptical about the products
of one’s own brain – to call what comes out a model. In this sense, models
are a typical example of preliminary physics.
Despite Apostel’s warning, some philosophers of science such as P. Achinstein
[1] and M. Bunge [7] have not stopped trying to precisely determine what a
model in physics is. I want to call their conception of “model” the Classical
View of Models. This essentially static view is briefly presented in the next
section (Sec. 2.1). Thereafter, in Sec. 2.2, the opposing Diachronic View of
Models that includes dynamic elements is presented. The distinction between
static and dynamic refers here (and throughout this article) exclusively to
theory construction.
7[2], p. 24
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2.1 The Classical View of Models
The Classical View of Models can be best understood as a reaction by a
group of philosophers of science (mainly with a strong background in theo-
retical physics) to the Logical Empiricist’ analysis of models (E. Nagel, R.
Braithwaite).8
For the sake of brevity, I will restrict myself here to the relevant work of M.
Bunge. P. Achinstein’s elaboration follows the same line of thought.9
M. Bunge reconstructs a theoretical model (or a special theory) in the following
way. A theoretical model consists of two components:
1. A general theory,
2. A special description of an object or system (model object).
The Billiard Ball Model of a gas illustrates this: In this case the general
theory is Newton’s mechanics, the special description contains statements
about the nature of a gas, e.g., that the molecules are point-like particles
moving in a chaotic way in a given box. With the so characterized Billiard
Ball Model it is now possible to derive the equation of state of an ideal gas:
pV = RT
Here, p, V and T represent the pressure, volume, and temperature of the
gas respectively, R is the gas constant. Experimentally, it is known that this
equation holds especially for (very) high temperatures.
Models have many remarkable features. One of them is that they – in a way
– suggest their own improvements.10 This is often obvious where idealized
assumptions facilitate the description of an object or system. By means of
concretization (L. Nowak11) the model can now be “improved”.12
In the case of the Billiard Ball Model it is clear how to make the model fit
the data better and to make it, in this sense, more realistic. It is well known
8Details of the Logical Empiricist’s conception of models can be found in the contribu-
tion by S. Psillos (these proceedings).
9I have discussed this in more detail in [12].
10This is demonstrated, for instance, by S. Toulmin, [26], p. 37 f.
11Cf. [19], pp. 29; see also [15].
12I do not want to enter the discussion of the model-reality issue. So I choose – for the
moment – the minimalist, instrumentalist interpretation: “To improve” means “getting
empirically more adequate”.
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that molecules are not point-like particles. They have a finite volume V0 and
this volume affects the system’s equation of state, too. A modification of the
model object along these lines leads to the van der Waals equation:
(p+
a
V 2
)(V − b) = RT
with adjustable parameters a and b depending on the special system under
investigation.
This improved equation of state of a gas allows now, for instance, a qualitative
understanding of the liquid-gas phase transition. In cases where even the van
der Waals description of a gas proves insufficient, there is a systematic way in
statistical mechanics to successively improve the model by calculating higher
virial coefficients.
Models of this kind are used for two main reasons:13
1. The testing of theories: General theories such as Newton’s mechan-
ics14 cannot be tested without making assumptions about some object
or system.15 Consequently, there is not much to be said about a gas
from a “fundamental” point of view.
However, there are general theories such as quantum electrodynamics
(QED) that can be tested directly. Without specifying any additional
model assumptions, cross sections and other physical observables can
be deduced and – subsequently – confronted with the available experi-
mental data. Now, one might argue that QED is not a general theory.
Instead one has to choose general quantum field theory. Starting from
this theory, QED is already a special model because for QED the “force
law” has been specified. Since this issue is primarily place a matter of
terminology I shall not continue discussing this point.
2. The probing of theories: Sometimes physicists are interested in the
qualitative type of behaviour of a given theory. In this case, construct-
ing a simple model (i.e. specifying a model object) can allow some
interesting insights. This function of a model comes close to what will
13Details can be found in [22].
14“Newton’s mechanics” here means the set of three axioms, without specifying the
special force law.
15There was a lot of confusion in the literature about auxiliary assumptions, initial
conditions, model assumptions and the like, see, for instance, the “battle” between H.
Putnam and K. Popper in [9].
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be described in Sec. 2.2.2 under the heading “Toy Models”. Such
models lack any direct physical application, they are just there . . .
There is a wealth of examples for models that fit this scheme fairly well.16
Nevertheless, this view is not a comprehensive account of models in physics.
Additional and, in fact, essential aspects shall be taken into consideration in
the following.
2.2 The Diachronic View of Models
The Classical View of models in physics is, essentially, a static one; it de-
scribes what kind of entity certain models are. Consequently, this scheme
does not cover dynamic issues like theory construction.
In this section, three different types of models are discussed: Models as a Sub-
stitute for a Theory (Sec. 2.2.1), Toy Models (Sec. 2.2.2) and Developmental
Models (Sec. 2.2.3). Let us begin with
2.2.1 Models as a Substitute for a Theory
Models as a Substitute for a Theory are of utmost importance for actual
research. Quite often in physics there is a fundamental theory that should –
in principle – permit the solution of a given problem. However, the theory
might be too complicated to handle in practice: The required equations are
either too complex to solve with the current analytical and numerical tools,
or – even worse – cannot be formulated at all.
There are many examples of such a situation in science: Quantum chromo-
dynamics (QCD), the “fundamental” theory of strong interactions, can – so
far – not be used for direct studies of the structure of hadrons and nuclei.17
Another example is almost the entire field of solid state physics. Because
of the complicated correlations between many particles, physicists have to
introduce simplifying “model”-assumptions. It is just impossible to recon-
struct the behavior of, say, a crystal in terms of quantum electrodynamics
(QED), the quantum theory of electromagnetic interaction.
16Others, like the Bohr Model of the atom, do not fit that easily but have been somewhat
forced to do so, cf. [1].
17For some years, however, physicists have been using high-powered computers for solv-
ing the relevant QCD-equations on a finite space-time lattice. This CPU-intensive proce-
dure is still not free of conceptional difficulties, see [24].
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Instead, physicists construct phenomenological models that effectively de-
scribe the relevant degrees of freedom of the system under consideration.
Nucleon and pion-fields are, for instance, the relevant degrees of freedom
of low-energy nuclear physics. In the course of investigating the physics
of superconductors, certain electron pairs (Cooper pairs) turned out to be
essential. This enormous physical insight represents the foundation of the
BCS-theory of superconductivity, as formulated by J.Bardeen, L. Cooper
and R. Schrieffer in 1957.
The technical advantage of this class of models is that they are easily (or
at least: in principle) soluble. However, the relation between the model and
the corresponding fundamental theory is somewhat fuzzy. Consequently, the
theoretical motivation of the models is unsettled. Furthermore, Models as a
Substitute for a Theory often entail many free parameters that have to be
determined empirically.
From the above considerations one might conclude that using Models as a
Substitute for a Theory primarily for pragmatic reasons is some exclusively
negative issue. This is, in fact, not the case at all! Models often provide more
physical insight than a fundamental theory, whose physical content might be
too difficult to disentangle. The following example from quantum field theory
illustrates this.
Due to the special structure of quantum chromodynamics (QCD), this theory
is applicable (and consequently: testable) – within the standard perturbative-
theoretical scheme – only within the high-energy realm. In the low-energy
domain of nuclear and hadron physics there is, however, no direct way to solve
the equations. In hadron18 physics, diverse phenomenological models permit
the calculation of hadronic properties, but at the price of being inexact and
not fundamental.
One such model is the MIT-Bag-Model. According to this model hadrons
consist of three massive quarks that move freely in a rigid sphere of radius
R. That hard sphere guarantees that the quarks remain confined inside, a
requirement of QCD.19 The fact that the quarks are allowed to move freely in-
side the sphere takes another feature of QCD into account, called asymptotic
freedom.
But why is there a sphere at all? Within the model the explanation is as
18Hadrons are particles that are governed by strong interactions, e.g. protons, neutrons
and pions.
19Confinement is not yet rigorously proven, but computer simulations suggest it [24].
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follows: When a hadron is created, the quarks “dig a hole” in the complicated
non-perturbative vacuum populated with gluons and other (scalar) entities.
Thus, space is separated into two very different regions: The foreseeable
inside (with quarks) and the messy outside (with gluons etc.).
Now, quarks moving inside the hadron expel a certain pressure on the bag’s
surface. That pressure has to exactly balance the pressure of the vacuum
surrounding the hadron, thus guaranteeing stable hadrons. Its numerical
value is determined by fixing some experimental datum.
With these model assumptions and considering the fact that free quarks
inside the cavity obey – as massive fermions – the free Dirac equation, one
can derive an expression for the baryon energy as a function of the radius R.
After minimizing this energy in respect to the bag radius R one finally ends
up with an expression for the total baryon energy.
It turns out that the resulting description of hadrons is quite good but there
are a couple of shortcomings. One is that the mass of the pion is much too
high. Another is that there is no mass difference between the nucleon and the
delta particle. Again, it is obvious how to concretize the model assumptions:
Additional, physically motivated energy terms can be introduced leading to
a more “realistic” description of hadrons.
In summary, the main advantages of this model are that it is very easy
to handle (it is almost possible to solve it analytically) and that it allows
new insights into the consequences of important features of the underlying
“fundamental” theory QCD.
So, Models as a Substitute for a Theory do not only serve to make actual cal-
culations feasible but, furthermore, allow some insight into physical mech-
anisms (“How does the confinement mechanism work?”) that cannot be
directly studied with the “fundamental” theory (in our example QCD).
2.2.2 Toy Models
Toy Models, as I understand them here, are models without any direct in-
tended physical application. Since physics has to do with a description of
observations in terms of suitable theories, one might ask why Toy Models
are studied at all. It is, indeed, very common in modern physics to investi-
gate types belonging to this class of models. Examples are known from all
branches of theoretical physics.
For the sake of illustration, let us first examine an example from quantum
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field theory. Quantum field theory is the general theory of quantized fields.20
It provides the frame for a description of the interaction of quantized fields
and gives concrete prescriptions for how to calculate – in principle – mea-
surable quantities. In the common formulation one starts with a Lagrangian
density that determines the nature of the particles involved as well as their
mutual interaction. Special examples of a quantum field theory are the
above-mentioned theories: quantum electrodynamics (QED) and quantum
chromodynamics (QCD).
The ϕ4-theory is characterized by the following Lagrangian density:
L = 1
2
∂µϕ∂
µϕ− µ2ϕ2 − λϕ4
Here, ϕ represents a self-interacting scalar (= spin-0). The parameters µ and
λ characterize the “potential”. Although the model is well formulated there
is no such (independent) scalar particle in nature.
Why is this theory proposed at all, then? Obviously, it is possible to construct
such a theory for the general formalism of quantum field theory that does
not specify both the concrete nature of the fields involved and their mutual
interaction. Quantum field theory only provides the framework for restricting
the fields to obey certain general constraints.
It is worth noting that the ϕ4-theory is the simplest quantum field theory
one can imagine. This, in turn, makes it possible to learn a lot from studying
this theory carefully. To mention only a few points:
1. To get a “feeling” for what quantum field theories really are.
2. To get used to special formal techniques (e.g. renormalization).
3. To extract general features which possibly every quantum field theories
has.
4. To providing a tool-box for possible mechanisms that can be “plugged-
in” to a future theory.
The ϕ4-theory exhibits the feature of spontaneous symmetry breaking. This
phenomenon occurs for certain parameter constellations. In this case the
state of lowest energy (the “ground state”) does not respect the symmetry
of the original Lagrangian density. That symmetry is said to be broken.
20An introduction “for philosophers” can be found in [23].
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This mechanism proved to be the “missing link” in the construction of the
Weinberg-Salam theory of electro-weak interactions. In order to formulate
this theory in the language of gauge theories, the intermediate bosons had
to be massless. However, from weak-interaction phenomenology it was well
known that the intermediate vector-bosons (the mediators of the weak force)
had to be very massive. So a ϕ4-like mechanism for a spontaneous symmetry
breaking was included, generating the dynamical mass of the vector-bosons.
2.2.3 Developmental Models
Besides this more or less pragmatic function, models are frequently used in
the process of developing a “fundamental” theory. Developmental Models
represent – in a systematic and historical respect – a step towards a “ready”
theory. The term Developmental Model was first introduced by J. Leplin [16]
in 1980. Leplin pointed out which role models played in the context of the
development of the early quantum mechanics by M. Planck and A. Einstein.
But, Developmental Models were not only valuable in the Good Old Days.
They are, in fact, an indispensable tool for theory construction in contem-
porary physics. An important contribution to the reconstruction of the de-
velopment of scientific theories was made by P. Suppes. In 1962, Suppes
reconstructed the development of a psychological theory (a special stimulus-
response theory) in terms of an increasing “tower” of models [25]. “Increas-
ing” here means that a model that is “higher” in the hierarchy is compatible
with more general laws. Furthermore, such models also usually cover a larger
set of phenomena than “lower” ones.
3 Case-Study: From the Hadron Zoo to
Quantum Chromodynamics
The following case-study21 is taken from High-Energy Physics. Quantum
chromodynamics (QCD) is, as has already been mentioned, now almost gen-
erally accepted as the “fundamental” theory of strong interactions. It is
supposed to cover many phenomena from nuclear and particle physics.
How did physicists arrive at this theory? The aim of this section is to recon-
struct the historical formulation process of QCD by means of a hierarchy of
21Historical details can be found in Refs. [20, 21].
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consecutive Developmental Models.
1. Collection of Data: The Hadron Zoo
The first phase of theory construction usually starts with collecting
the data that the theory is supposed to describe. Sometimes these
data have been known for a very long time and have already been
framed by some theory or model. Further, it is possible that physicists
discover data “by accident”, like in the case of the 3K background
radiation in 1963 by A. Penzias and R. Wilson or, more recently, high-
Tc superconductivity by J. G. Bednorz and K. A. Mu¨ller.
In the first stage of the physics of strong interactions (starting in the
early 1930’s) experimental physicists collected a tremendous amount
of data of new and so far not yet classified “elementary particles”.
These particles were initially produced in low-energy nuclear reactions
occurring when an accelerated atomic nucleus hits some metal foil (con-
sisting, inter alia, of a large number of atomic nuclei). In this case the
nuclei of the foil happen to “react” with the nuclei of the accelerated
beam. As a result, new particles are produced. Experimentalists deter-
mined the mass and electrical charge of these particles. If the particles
were unstable they tried to extract the properties of the decayed par-
ticles from the corresponding decay products.
It should be noted that the – so far – unknown theory (i.e. QCD) was
not assumed for the determination of particle properties. The identi-
fication of mass, charge and decay products of the new particles only
presupposes an older, highly confirmed and accepted theory: Maxwell’s
theory of electromagnetism.
2. Introduction of New, Internal Concepts: Spin, Isospin and Strangeness
For a theoretical physicist not much is achieved with a listing of many
positive data. He wishes to understand why the data are as they are
or, as some philosopher might even ask, how the data must be. For
this purpose, it is necessary to introduce concepts that structure the
given data. In this sub-section we are mainly concerned with “internal”
concepts, i.e. concepts that refer only to the data without assuming any
high-level laws. But how exactly do scientists proceed to achieve this
aim? The following methodological rules, extracted from an analysis
of the research process, might help:
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(a) Analyze data in respect to similarities. Is it possible to arrange
some data into “blocks”?
(b) Adopt old concepts that proved useful in a similar situation.
(c) Construct new concepts analogous to already known ones.
Common to all these rules is the postulation of some analogy relation
between different parts of a “data field” or between some already com-
prehended and still not comprehended structures.
Again, this will be illustrated with the example of the physics of strong
interactions. The process of gaining a deeper understanding of ele-
mentary particles starts from a thorough analysis of the corresponding
decay channels. Some particle might “prefer” to decay exclusively into
one channel while other channels happen to be “forbidden”.22
The first concept to be introduced was spin. Spin is an angular
momentum-like quantum number whose invention (for electrons) was
originally motivated by the famous Stern-Gerlach experiment: When a
beam of atoms with an uneven number of electrons encounters an in-
homogeneous magnetic field, it splits into two partial beams. One can
proceed in just the same way with protons and other stable particles.23
Nevertheless, this procedure cannot be applied to unstable particles.
Since most known particles are in fact unstable, additional theoretical
arguments are necessary. To mention just a few:
(a) The Conservation Law for the Total Angular Momentum
(= orbital angular momentum + spin): Starting from particles
whose spin is already known (or conventionally fixed), the spin of
new particles can be determined by analyzing decay products of
suitable reactions.
(b) The Principle of Detailed Balance: It is known that the tran-
sition matrix element for the reactions A + B → C + D and
C +D → A + B are equal. Thus, the ratio of the corresponding
cross sections is only a function of the respective angular momenta.
This implies that unknown spins can be related to already known
ones.
22One more example of the anthropomorphic language of physicists that I adopt here.
23The particles have to be at least quasi-stable, i.e. they should not decay within the
apparatus.
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(c) The Spin Statistics Theorem: According to this theorem (W.
Pauli and G. Lu¨ders, 1954) particles have either integer (bosons)
or half-integer (fermions) spin. This principle theoretically es-
tablishes that unstable particles also have the intrinsic property
“spin”.
Whereas the spin concept has been transferred from atomic physics to
elementary particle physics, “isospin” and “strangeness” appeared for
the first time in particle physics. In order to fully understand why cer-
tain decay processes occur and others do not, it is indeed necessary to
introduce additional conserved quantities. In 1932 W. Heisenberg pos-
tulated that “isospin” is a conserved quantity in strong interactions.24
Already the term “isospin” exhibits the structural analogy and concep-
tual isomorphy to the spin concept. Heisenberg recognized that protons
and neutrons are very similar in many respects. Although they differ in
their (electrical) charge, Heisenberg postulated that strong interactions
are “blind” in respect to the particles’ electric charge.
After World War II it was possible to accelerate particles to higher and
higher energies. It then became apparent that more and more particles
did not fit in the scheme. Prompted by those experiments, M. Gell-
Mann and others introduced “strangeness” as an additional quantum
number in strong interactions in 1953.
So the hadron “zoo” became gradually organized. Furthermore, physi-
cists began to develop some intuition concerning possible and impossi-
ble particle reactions.
This example shows paradigmatically how science proceeds from the
known to the still unknown. New concepts (like spin and isospin) are
derived from analogical reasoning and lead by experimental discoveries.
3. Refining and Unifying Internal Concepts: The Eightfold Way
An essential feature of the process of improving the data-modeling is the
“enrichment” with general principles and the integration of preliminary
concepts into already known fundamental ones, whereby the intention
is to achieve the desired unified description.
In the case of hadron physics, it became, after a while, obvious to the
physics community that the classification scheme in terms of “spin”,
24Heisenberg himself used the term “Isobarenspin”.
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“isospin” and “strangeness” was not the last word. After all, there
was no general dynamic theory that covered creation and annihilation
processes of elementary particles. There were only models that were
tried by physicists (and, possibly, intended to be part of a Develop-
mental Model hierarchy) but led nowhere. An example of this sort of
model is the Yukawa theory for mesons. The major desideratum was
a field theory for hadrons comparable in its extent to the quantum
electrodynamics (QED) for electrons. Although QED was not without
conceptional problems, it was nevertheless considered a very successful
dynamic theory for all phenomena governed by electromagnetism only.
However, the “connections” that physicists tried to establish between
special features of strong interactions and QED were often misleading.
Instead, M. Gell-Mann and G. Zweig worked out, independently of each
other,25 a unifying classification scheme in terms of spin, isospin and
strangeness quantum numbers. Driven by the observation that eight
and ten of the hadrons of lowest energy have a mass in the same range,
these authors postulated that they have in fact the same mass. This is
a typical idealization.
Mathematically, the feature of a common mass can be expressed in
terms of a new symmetry. This symmetry is called SU(3) or – as
Gell-Mann dubbed it– “The Eightfold Way”. All strongly interact-
ing particles belong to “multiplets” or – in suitable group theoretical
language – irreducible representations of the group SU(3). Famous
examples of such multiplets are the meson- and baryon octet and the
baryon decuplet.
Within the group theoretical framework it turned out that the octet and
decuplet representations can simply be constructed by tensor products
of the “fundamental” representation of SU(3) that is itself – interest-
ingly enough – not realized in nature.
For the tensor products of three fundamental representations 3 (triplet)
one obtains:
3⊗ 3⊗ 3 = 1⊕ 8⊕ 8⊕ 10
Thus, one decuplet (10), two octets (8) and one singlet (1) can be
“generated”. All but the singlet have a counterpart in the real world.
25Differences between the two approaches are pointed out in [21], pp. 85.
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Similarly, for the product of a triplet (3) and an anti-triplet (3¯) one
obtains:
3⊗ 3¯ = 1⊕ 8
Besides the (physically realized) octet, again one “dubious” singlet oc-
curs.
What is the status of the fundamental representation 3? Although
there is no obvious counterpart in nature, hadrons seem to “consist” of
entities “belonging” to it. Why is the fundamental representation not
realized?
In the mid-sixties, many physicists were rather skeptical of a possible
ontological interpretation of the elements of the fundamental represen-
tation later to be named “quarks” by M. Gell-Mann.
But there was still another problem if quarks turned out to be really
there. Being spin-1/2 particles and thus fermions, quarks should obey
the Pauli-Principle. However, in the case of the baryon decuplet it
can be easily shown that just this fundamental principle seems to be
violated if quarks were more than just a quirk of group theory.
This example shows how new perspectives result from unifying old
concepts. The resulting description of data is now more comprehensive.
4. (Ad hoc) Correction of (External) Inconsistencies: The Color-Concept
A forerunner of a theory might be inconsistent. Usually, one distin-
guishes between internal and external inconsistencies.
A set M of sentences is internally inconsistent, if M permits the
derivation of some statement A and its opposite A¯. Clearly, a physical
theory has to be internally consistent.
A theory is externally inconsistent, if a contradiction ensues when
additional external principles such as conservation laws are taken into
account. In this sense, the quark model (as described above) is incon-
sistent. In order to understand how this contradiction was resolved, let
us follow the historical development.
The fourth stage in the construction of quantum chromodynamics
started with some famous experiments. Experimentalists at Stanford
studied the scattering of high-energy electrons on protons. They clearly
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demonstrated that the nucleon itself is not point-like, but displays an
inner structure just like the atomic nucleus.
In his famous Parton Model R. Feynman could subsequently explain the
new data by assuming that the nucleon “consists” of three particles of
spin 1/2. It was only a straight forward step to identify these particles
with Gell-Mann’s quarks.
To finally succeed in this identification it is important to eliminate
the contradiction with the universally valid Pauli Principle. M. Gell-
Mann dealt with this problem in the simplest way imaginable: He
postulated the existence of a new quantum number, called color, that
re-established the validity of the Pauli Principle for quarks.
It should be noted that the introduction of “color” was nothing but an
ad hoc hypothesis in the first stage. Shortly thereafter this ingenious
move turned out to be the final step towards a gauge theory of strong
interactions.
The example given above is one more piece of evidence for I. Lakatos’
famous statement that “it may be rational to put the inconsistency
into some temporary, ad hoc quarantine, and carry on with the positive
heuristics of the programme.”26 Strictly speaking, only the one true
theory has to be fully consistent. However, this theory might not even
exist.
5. Integrating Everything into a General Frame: The Gauge Theory Con-
cept
Depending on the complexity of the data to be described several of
the steps discussed above might turn out to be necessary. The “ulti-
mate” aim of physicists is, however, to embed everything in a general
framework.
In the case of elementary particle physics, quantum field theory is such
a generalized framework. Quantum field theory provides a general for-
malism that facilitates the description of the interaction of “elemen-
tary” quantum fields. Historically, this structure resembles what I.
Lakatos called the “hard core” of a scientific research programme.27
26[13], p. 58.
27J. Cushing [8] argued convincingly for this thesis.
16
Since the early 1950’s, QED is – mainly because of its great empir-
ical success – the paradigm of a quantum field theory. Calculations
of physical observables like the anomalous magnetic moment of the
electron agree with the experimental value by up to twelve significant
figures. After the establishment of QED, physicists soon extended the
formalism and started to quantize other fields. A special sub-class of all
possible quantum field theories is of considerable significance: renor-
malizable local gauge theories.
Following in the spirit of these theories, firstly the theory of electro-
weak interactions and, some years later, QCD were developed. It is
worth noting that the color-concept played a key role in this process.
This is – so far – the end point of the development of the physics of strong
interactions. There is diverse research in progress to include QCD in an even
more comprehensive theoretical framework. However, this kind of physics is
not yet well enough established for our purposes.
This – somewhat lengthy – case-study should show in detail the role played
by models in the process of constructing a new theory.
4 Summary
Physicists use many different types of models. The Classical View covers
pragmatic aspects such as applying, testing and probing of already existing
theories. Within the Diachronic View, dynamic aspects of science can be
considered. Models play a major role in the process of theory construction
and provide possible physical mechanisms in advance that can subsequently
turn out to be fruitful. All in all, models are a favorite tool of preliminary
physics.
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